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Yesterday it was the turn of the Lisbon Agenda. Tomorrow it will be that of 
EU 2020. This new economic strategy is primarily aimed at producing 
sustained growth. So far, so good. However, the crucial issue is to readjust 
the basic governance. The 2020 strategy requires genuine benchmarking, 
a European Council of Economic Experts, and more research funding in 
the European Union’s budget.  
 
I 
The Bottom Line 
The EU heads of state and government were 
not exactly being modest when in March 2000 
they proclaimed that they wanted to turn the 
EU into the “most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economic area in the world” 
by 2010. 
 
These rather striking words mirrored the spirit 
of the millennium. The IT bubble was still in 
full swing, and the great crisis a long way 
away. The New Economy had made people 
euphoric. By the 1990s the (small western) EU 
had caught up with the US in economic terms. 
But now it looked as if the ongoing American 
start-up boom was leaving the Old World 
behind. At the same time the unending 
upsurge in the US seemed to betoken that 
there were no limits to innovation-driven 
growth. It was clear that something had to be 
done in Europe. 
 
This unusual tour de force was supposed to 
catapult the EU into the fast lane, and there 
was a belief that it would be possible to 
unleash a hitherto unknown dynamism in the 
sectors of the future, which ranged from 
information technology and multimedia to 
biotechnology and telecommunications. The 
n e w  j o b s  w e r e  s u p p o s e d  t o  m a k e  t h e  O l d  
World not only more productive, but also to 
provide better working conditions than those 
prevalent in the ageing industrial sectors. All 
this was designed to increase the social 
cohesion of the Union, minimize poverty, and 
protect the environment with the help of a 
new wave of “clean” growth. 
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Ten years down the road it is clear that Europe 
has not come up with the hoped-for 
developmental leap. Before the outbreak of the 
financial crisis in 2008, the employment quota 
in the EU was 66% (the target was 70%). 1.9% 
of GDP was spent on research and 
development in the same year, and this was 
not an improvement on 2000 (the target was 
3%, which was reached only by Sweden and 
Finland). The productivity gap between the EU 
and the US has hardly diminished. And the 
European Commission itself bewails the fact 
that in places where jobs have been created, 
poverty has often not been eradicated. 
 
The progress that the Commission puts down 
to the Lisbon process in its provisional 
evaluation is rather vague. Brussels believes 
that there is now a basic understanding of 
why reforms are necessary.  Countries were 
learning more from one another. And 
cooperation between the EU and the member 
states had been “a positive experience.” 
 
There are many reasons why the bottom line 
has been such a disappointment. Since its 
inception many external events have held up 
the process. Thus the New Economy came to a 
sudden end when the internet bubble burst. 
The attacks on 11 September 2001 led to a 
downturn in the international economic 
climate. And the enlargement of the EU in 
2004 and 2007 made it difficult to continue 
with a process which had originally been 
conceived for the west European club of 15. 
Even today all the indices show that the new 
members are still below the averages for the 
old members. Furthermore, since 2008 all the 
states of the EU have had to struggle with the 
consequences of the global economic and 
financial crisis. 
Furthermore, soon after the adoption of the 
agenda the EU’s political priorities shifted in 
other directions. Thus the general public and 
the political decision-makers were primarily 
interested in the forthcoming enlargement of 
the Union and the debate surrounding the EU 
constitution. The implementation of the joint 
strategy for growth was left to political 
specialists and professionals working behind 
the scenes. Decisive and visible political 
support for Lisbon was in evidence neither in 
Brussels nor in the majority of the member 
states. There was no upsurge, and the desire 
to catch up petered out and became a 
stumbling gait. 
 
Yet the strategy itself had some fundamental 
faults. For example, the agenda was simply 
overloaded. The Kok group headed by the  
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former Dutch prime minister already pointed 
this out in its half-time report at the end of 
2004. The EU reacted by concentrating its 
efforts on growth and the creation of jobs (the 
slogan was “Jobs and Growth”). There was 
nevertheless an impenetrable jungle of partial 
targets which complicated the implementation 
structure and the transmission to the 
electorate. Possible synergies with existing 
programmes and instruments such as the 
Stability and Growth Pact, the Social Agenda, 
or the Sustainable Development Strategy were 
either rarely activated or not at all. 
 
As a result of the lack of an obvious political 
will and without a clearly defined narrative, 
the majority of Europeans were not familiar 
with the Lisbon strategy. In fact, many people 
believed that the agenda and the Treaty of 
Lisbon were one and the same thing. Thus it 
was only logical that large-scale support for 
the reform targets failed to materialize. 
 
The management and implementation of the 
strategy was also confused and rather clumsy. 
From the beginning it was clear that the 
targets could not be attained solely by 
adopting certain measures on the community 
level. The agenda represented a 
comprehensive challenge for each individual 
economy within the EU. For this reason there 
was a set of reforms in Brussels and the 
individual member states which mutually 
reinforced each other. New forms of 
governance such as the “Open Method of 
Coordination” were devised in order to provide 
a framework for coordinated action. However, 
there was no real coordination. Since there 
were no sanctions or reward mechanisms, the 
agenda continued to be a non-binding 
agreement. 
 
II 
Carrots Instead of Sticks: 
“Naming” and “Praising” 
From the very beginning governance was a 
basic problem of the Lisbon strategy. In the 
Open Method of Coordination the member 
states were supposed to work together 
voluntarily and to utilize the “best practices” 
of other countries for their national structures. 
To put it in a nutshell: this idea has not 
worked. There was no willingness to adopt it 
on the part of the member states, nor did the 
European Commission have enough clout and 
the ability to impose sanctions in order to 
implement certain kinds of reform. 
 
The Kok report made a point of specifying 
these deficits, and then suggested the method 
of “naming, shaming and faming.” It proposed 
an annual ranking with which the European 
Commission would praise the positive 
achievements of member states and criticize 
things which were negative. This plan came to 
grief in the Commission. Its president, José 
Manuel Barroso, did not have the slightest 
wish to be seen as a schoolmaster handing out 
marks to individual member states in general 
and the larger ones in particular. 
 
Yet the basic notion of benchmarking is not 
wrong. Communication, as the Commission 
noted in its analysis, was the “Achilles’ heel of 
the Lisbon process.” If there is no public 
pressure on individual member states, and if 
at the same time the significance of the EU 
strategy is not understood by the electorate, 
national governments will not feel compelled 
to change anything. 
 
But how might it be possible to introduce a 
benchmarking mechanism into the Lisbon 
follow-up strategy? First of all the results of 
the  Commission’s consultation on the EU 
2020 strategy demonstrate that the EU 
governments are aware of the fact that 
effective monitoring, genuine benchmarking 
and an enhanced feeling of responsibility are 
absolutely essential if the Lisbon follow-up 
agenda is to be a success. However, only a few 
member states are prepared to concede a 
greater role to the Commission in the 
supervision of the agenda targets. 
 
The new strategy should have a “naming and 
praising” mechanism. This means that the 
best member states will be singled out every 
year. They will be praised, and given 
additional EU financing which they may use 
only for the targets of the EU 2020 process. In  
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this way the Lisbon follow-up strategy would 
become an inverted Stability and Growth Pact 
which is combined with a modern educational 
approach. The bad states are not punished, but 
the good ones will receive a reward. Incentives 
instead of sanctions is the name of the game. 
 
The important point is not the amount of 
funding actually given to the annual winner. 
One could probably agree on a small and fairly 
symbolic amount, which would dispose of the 
argument that EU funds were being allocated 
incorrectly. The incentive for the member 
states would be the prize itself. What could a 
national government want more than to be the 
winner of an EU competition ? In order to give 
economically weaker member states a chance 
of winning, the assessment of their 
achievement would have to concentrate less 
on the current status, and more on 
developments over the past year. 
 
The European Parliament should be the 
catalyst of a broad public debate about the EU 
2020 strategy. For example, it could invite the 
annual winner to the Parliament or award a 
special prize. 
 
This “carrots instead of sticks approach” will 
change the reports of and debates about the 
EU 2020 strategy. The focus will be on an 
analysis of the best concepts and recipes for 
success, and this will benefit the strategy and 
in the final analysis the EU as perceived by 
the general public. At any rate, every 
government will still be motivated not to land 
at the bottom of the list. 
 
In order to ensure that this new best practices 
procedure is a success, the European 
Commission must jettison its role as a moral 
authority. The impression that Brussels is 
prescribing something and trying to impose 
sanctions on incorrect behaviour makes it 
possible for national governments to find 
welcome communication escape routes when 
they do badly. For this reason it should stop 
acting like a schoolmaster and delegate the 
praise meted out to the best to a new and 
neutral authority, the European Council of 
Economic Experts. 
 
III 
A European Council of 
Economic Experts 
Credibility is a question of independence. This 
is the reason why nowadays most (and all 
successful) central banks in the world are 
independent of political orders issued by their 
governments. Only their independence makes 
it possible for them to take monetary decisions 
in line with the facts even if they are 
unpleasant and politically disliked. 
Independence is the best self-protection 
against one’s intrinsic opportunism. Thus it is 
always the most suitable institutional 
arrangement if one’s interests can lead one to 
make the wrong decisions. For this reason it is 
in the interests of the European Commission 
to delegate the proposed “naming and 
praising” to an independent body, a European 
Council of Economic Experts (ECEX). 
 
The Commission should take the initiative and 
propose to the heads of state and government 
such a European Council of Economic Experts 
and define its core task as the objective 
evaluation of the Lisbon follow-up strategy. 
Constructed on the model of the German 
“Council of Economic Experts,” the European 
Council of Economic Experts should be 
appointed by the heads of state and 
government at the suggestion of the 
Commission and confirmed by the European 
Parliament. But in its work, its opinions and 
its specific proposals the Council should be 
independent of political instructions. The 
E C E X  w i l l  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  s u b m i t  r e g u l a r  
evaluation reports on the state of the 
implementation of the EU 2020 process, 
evaluate the contributions and progress of the 
individual member states, and submit 
proposals to the Commission for the 
implementation of “naming and praising” 
procedure. 
 
The structure of the ECEX should correspond 
to its tasks. The core of the Council should 
consist of five experts with a pan-European 
reputation who are supported by an 
appropriate research department. The “five  
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E u r o p e a n  w i s e  m e n ”  should be well-known 
professors, members of think tanks or 
individuals with an academic reputation who 
can vouch for the intellectual quality and 
objectivity of the work of the Council. The 
Council should be supervised by a “board” of 
well-known European personalities, which at 
the same time would be the Council’s face for 
the European electorate. Elder statesmen 
would be just as suitable for the job as other 
popular Europeans who could secure attention 
and prestige for the work of the Council. In 
order to profit from the reputation of the 
European Central Bank, the offices of the 
ECEX should be located at the ECB 
headquarters in Frankfurt am Main, which at 
the same time would supply logistical and 
technical support.  
 
However, turning Council recommendations 
into political action in the framework of the 
new strategy of “naming and praising” would 
continue to be the task of the Commission, the 
heads of state and government, and of the 
European Parliament. The ECEX would submit 
the recommendations, and the political actors 
would give an undertaking to refer explicitly 
to them in their decisions contained in 
opinions issued on a regular basis. 
 
This would contain arbitrary political acts and 
political opportunism. The Commission, the 
European Parliament and even the heads of 
state and government would be protected 
against themselves, and they would be able to 
explain their frequently unpopular decisions 
in a more objective manner. Thus the 
European Council of Economic Experts would 
also provide suitable institutional 
immunization against the “Greek virus,” a 
creeping loss of credibility of the European 
institutions with regard to the implementation 
and supervision of their political goals and 
strategies. Here again the German Council of 
Economic Experts could serve as a model. It is 
often a useful buffer that gives politicians 
some respite in their dealings with lobbyists 
and special interest groups because they are 
able to justify their unpopular decisions by 
citing the objectivity of the Council of 
Economic Experts. 
 
This is also a great opportunity for the EU 
2020 strategy. The willingness to conduct an 
objective evaluation is evidence of political 
seriousness and secures additional attention 
and credibility for the EU 2020 strategy. And 
that is precisely the common currency which 
Europe needs most in the wake of the 
disappointments with the Lisbon strategy, the  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
i
s
b
o
n
 
–
 
A
 
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
S
h
o
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
a
g
e
 
6
 
#
 
2
0
1
0
/
0
2
 
financial mayhem, the crisis of confidence, 
and the Greek budget disaster. Credibility. 
 
IV 
EU 2020 in Budget 
The national research expenditure of the 
member states should by now in the course of 
the Lisbon process have reached 3 percent of 
G D P .  I n  f a c t  i t  i s  a t  a b o u t  2  
percent, with considerable 
differences between the EU 
member states. Only Sweden and 
Finland have passed the three 
percent mark. 
 
This work for the future also gets 
short shrift in the EU budget. 
Under Heading 6 of the EU 
Budget just about €5 billion was 
earmarked for research in 2009, 
which is in fact eleven percent 
more than in the previous year. 
However, the EU is spending 
more than €51 billion on 
agriculture and the development 
of rural areas, and about €11 
billion on employment and social 
issues. The optical improvement 
of the budget into sections 
entitled “Sustained Growth” and 
“Natural Resources” changes 
little. The largest part of about 
€134 billion is still being spent 
on the wrong things. 
 
To be fair, the proportion of 
agricultural expenditure in the 
EU budget has declined 
considerably between 1988 and 
now, from 61 percent to 41 
percent. Those who are led to   
hope that the forthcoming 
negotiations on financial 
resources from 2013 onwards–which is when 
the current framework comes to an end–will 
finally introduce a modern and globalization-
based expenditure policy may be bitterly 
disappointed. The budget structure is 
negotiated among 27 governments in a tough 
procedure in which everyone is keen to 
protect his own interests. 
 
The EU Commission believes that the 
challenges of our time include food security, in 
addition to environmental catastrophes, 
consumer protection, epidemics, or combating 
crime. All require far more research funding 
than the member states are either prepared or 
in a position to make available. Nor does the 
EU budget make adequate provision for this. 
The EU can only meet the challenges of the 
future if it provides funds for research. 
Everyone knows and keeps saying this–and 
yet people do not act accordingly. However, 
there is a simple way of increasing research 
conducted with EU funding–which, measured  
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against the total expenditure for research in 
the EU, will continue to be the smaller portion, 
since most of the money is provided by 
national budgets or companies–before the 
forthcoming budget negotiations. If this were 
to be done via the research budget as a part of 
the total expenditure, it would lead to 
redistribution debates and to a great deal of 
haggling. 
 
This can be largely avoided if an invariable 
percentage of research funding is laid down 
for every applicable heading in the EU budget. 
Energy, transport, agricultural policy and 
fisheries, environment or communications 
could, for example, earmark three percent of 
their own budgets for research in their   
particular fields. In the case of €51 billion 
agricultural expenditure this would provide 
more than €1.5 billion for agricultural 
research, and in the case of €10 billion for 
“Maritime affairs and fisheries” to a research 
budget of €300 million. 
 
Although this would not totally prevent the 
feared distribution struggles, it would mean 
that they would have to be conducted in a 
fruitful manner. What agricultural research is 
worth supporting, and, above all, where is the 
new funding going to go? It should not be 
forgotten that the EU research landscape is 
just as diverse as the surface relief maps of 
the Union. However, this kind of distribution 
struggle can be terminated more easily than  
 
the bitter disputes surrounding EU 
expenditures as a whole.  
 
V 
A Social Market Economy 
in Europe  
There needs to be a new storyline if the EU 
2020 strategy is to be more successful than its 
predecessors. Both the targets and the general 
direction of what is being done must be 
communicated clearly and unambiguously. 
Furthermore, EU citizens and social partners 
s h o u l d  p l a y  a n  a c t i v e  r o l e  i n  p o l i c y m a k i n g .  
T h i s  i s  t h e  o n l y  w a y  o f  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  E U  
citizens know about what is being done, and 
that they will support the project. This in turn 
is of crucial importance for the resolve of the 
political actors as they implement the reforms. 
 
The EU 2020 strategy must make it clear to 
Europeans that it is now all about showing the 
world how qualitative economic and 
employment growth, social justice and 
sustainability can be brought together in a 
creative way. The times of growth for the sake 
of growth are gone for ever. The Europeans 
want a progressive social agenda which seeks 
to enshrine a social market economy in 
Europe. This is exactly what “EU 2020” should 
be striving to attain. 
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